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1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 [hereinafter GATT]; Article XX GATT reads in
its relevant parts:
General Exceptions
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the or enforcement by any Member of measures: ***
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life and health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption; ***
2. From the Latin phrase: Domine, quo vadis?, meaning "Master, where do
you go?".
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Introduction

Recently, a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute panel
ruled that Washington's import ban on shrimp caught in a manner
that allows the bycatch of endangered sea turtles breaches free
trade rules.'
Last October, the Appellate Body4 within the
dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO rejected a United States
attempt to overturn this ruling. This decision caused mixed
reactions among United States representatives and environmental
groups:5 some see the report as furthering environmental concerns
within the GATT jurisdiction,6 but many complain that the
decision merely reflects the WTO's difficulty with environmental
issues.7 This article critically analyzes the Appellate Body report,
compares it to previous WTO dispute body decision and discusses
the future implications of the Appellate Body's holdings.
Chapter II introduces the conflict between trade and environment and how this conflict is related to the provisions of the
GATT. This leads to the description of the underlying facts of the
Shrimp/Turtle case, that completes part two. Chapters three and
four contain a detailed analysis of the Shrimp/Turtle Appellate
Body Report.
Chapter three focuses on the environmental
exception in Article XX(g) GAT, 8 in particular the discussion
about the meaning of "exhaustible" and "relating to," as well as the
problem of "extrajurisdictionality". Part four then examines the
report's holding concerning the introductory clause of Article XX,

3. Appellate Body Report on United States - Import of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, October 12, 1998, 1998
WT/DS58/AB/R [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report].
4. One achievement of the Uruguay Round is the new dispute-settlement
understanding, which established an appellate procedure. The Appellate Body is
a panel of three persons drawn from a permanent roster of seven persons; see
Uruguay Round Final Act, Annex 2, Understanding of Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 33 I.L.M. 1226 [hereinafter DSU], Article
17.
5. Frances Williams & Guy de Jonqui~res, US Appeal on Shrimp Import Ban
Rejected, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at 10; Anne Swardson, Turtle-ProtectionLaw
Overturned by WTO, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 13, 1998, at C2, cites Matthew
Stillwell (CIEL): "It's better law, but it's still the same result."
6. Charlene Barshefsky: "The report does not suggest that we weaken our
environmental laws in any respect", cited in Williams & de Jonquires, supra note
5; Phillipe Sands, Lecture at American University, WCL, Nov. 11, 1998.
7. Sierra Club: "the WTO is broken and must be fixed," cited in Williams &
de Jonquinres, supra note 5.
8. All Articles referred to in this article, are provisions of the GATT, unless
otherwise stated.
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the so-called chapeau.9 The article ends in chapter five with a
short conclusion, which is combined with an outlook to future
disputes.
II.
A.

Survey of the Trade and Environment Conflict
The Conflict of Trade and the Environment: A Broad

Perspective
An important issue concerning the completed and the ongoing
negotiations and discussions about multilateral and regional trade
agreements is whether and how unrestricted or "free" trade can be
reconciled with environmental protection."
The WTO member
countries' ministers expressed the opinion, "that there should not
be, nor need be, any policy contradiction between upholding and
safeguarding an open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral
trading system on the one hand, and acting for the protection of
the environment, and the promotion of sustainable development on
the other."" According to a more realistic point of view, however, there are numerous points of conflict. It has been argued that
the free movement of goods and products between countries leads
to environmental degradation. The given reasons include the
unsustainable growth of production and consumption,1 2 the
lowering or non-enforcement of environmental standards ("race to

9. This order is chosen in reference to the "fundamental structure and logic
of Article XX," which contains "first a provisional justification by reason of
characterization of the measure under XX(g); second, further appraisal of the
same measure under the introductory clause." Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body
Report, supra note 3, at 33, paras. 118-19.
10. See, inter alia, the articles Betsy Baker, Protection, not Protectionism:
MultilateralEnvironmentalAgreements and the GATT, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 437 (1993); Robert Housman, The North American Free Trade Agreement's
Lessons for Reconciling Trade and the Environment, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 379;
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Trade and Environment: Free International Trade and
Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700
(1992); C. Foster Knight, Effects of National Environmental Regulation on
International Trade and Investment - Selected Issues, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J.
212 (1991); Xavier Carlos Vasquez, Symposium of the North American Free Trade
Agreement: The North American Free Trade Agreement and Environmental
Racism, 34 HARV. INT'L L. J. 357 (1993); Geoffrey W. Levin, Note, The
Environment and Trade - A MultilateralImperative, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
231 (1992).
11. Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Decision on Trade and Environment, 15
Apr. 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
12. HERMAN DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (1996).
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the bottom"), 13 or the branding of environmental regulations as
unlawful trade measures.14 However, free trade is regarded as an

important instrument for global peace, development, and the
efficient use of resources. 5
B. The Conflict Under GATT in General

Based on the environmental harm of the production and
process methods of a product or the use of a product, environ-

mental regulations impose restrictions, such as import bans or taxes
on the product. Given the objective of the WTO to promote free
trade, it is not surprising that environmental measures cause
disputes within its legal framework. The GATT and the WTO
dispute settlement system16 has been the most frequently used

dispute settlement system to resolve environmental disputes
17
between countries.
Articles I, III, and XI place limits on the application of these
regulations concerning imported products. If the burden placed on

the imported goods is greater than for like domestic products, 8 a

13. DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 1172-73 (1996).
14. DAVID A. ESTY, GREENING THE GATr: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND
THE FUTURE 52-54 (1994); C. Foster Knight, supra note 10, at 213-216; Mike

Meier, GATT, WTO, And the Environment To What Extent Do GATT/WTO
Rules Permit Member Nations to Protect the Environment When Doing so
Adversely Affects Trade?, 8 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 241, 280-282
(1997); see next section of this article.
15. DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 81 (1817); HUNTER, supra note 13, at 1167-69.
16. As noted before, supra note 4, the WTO dispute settlement system was
reformed during the Uruguay Round. The system is available for disputes
concerning all agreements which are part under the WTO system (Article 1.1
DSU), though some agreements may apply additional rules (Article 1.2 DSU).
After the failure of consultations (Article 4 DSU) between the conflicting countries the complainant can request a panel (Article 6 DSU). The panel consists of
3 (or 5, see Article 8.5 DSU) trade experts (Article 8.1 DSU). A remarkable
change is that the final panel report will be adopted unless a consensus rejects it.
Further, either side can appeal the panel's decision (Article 17 DSU). In the case
that a trade violation is reported, the losing defendant has to bring its policy into
the line with the recommendations or ruling (Article 21 DSU). If the country fails
the complainant can ask for compensation (Article 22 DSU). As last resort the
complainant can apply limited trade sanctions (Article 22.2).
17. Steve Charnowitz, Environment and Health Under the WTO Dispute
System, 32 INT'L LAWYER 901, at 901 (1998).
18. The question concerning the likeness of products is one of the major issues
in the trade and environment GATT debate, see United States - Taxes on
Automobiles, Report of the Panel, Sept. 29, 1994, WT/DS31/R, para. 5.5-5.8.
However, in the decision at stake this problem is not discussed, and, therefore, will
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violation of at least one of the mentioned core principles of the
GATT can be determined.19 However, the GATT provides a
number of exceptions which allow other justified objectives to
precede over the advantages to be gained from free trade. This is
where Article XX becomes relevant. Article XX(a)-(j) enumerates
acceptable goals, such as the protection of public morals,20 life and
22 national treasures, 23
health monopolies, 21 patents, trademarks,
exhaustible natural resources, 24 or essential materials to a domes26
tic processing industry,25 and the exploitation of prison labor.
The question of whether a violation of a free trade principle that
pursues one of these goals can be justified then requires a further
examination and thorough evaluation of the conflicting interests.
Besides the GeneralExceptions in Article XX, the GATT contains
the Security Exceptions in Article XXI, exceptions for free trade
areas in Article XXIV, and the instrument of an extraordinary
waiver by a two-third majority vote in Article XXV:5.
Further violations of WTO agreements by such environmental
regulations might arise under the General Agreement on Trade in
2
Services 27 or the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. 1
C. The Conflict in the Shrimp/Turtle Case
The conflict underlying the Shrimp/Turtle case concerns a 1989
amendment to the United States Endangered Species Act of
197329 and the so-called Section 60930 that generally prohibit the
not be considered in this article.
19. See for a detailed analysis of the application of Article I, III and XI to
environmental regulations Steve Charnowitz, International Environmental Law
Colloqium: Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GA TT Rules and Their Application to
Environmental Trade Measures, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299,490-92 (1994); Charnowitz

(1998), supra note 17, at 902-908; Foster, Mark Edwards, Note, Trade and
Environment:Making Room ForEnvironmental Trade Measures Within the GA TT,
71 SOUTHERN CAL. L. REV. 393, 420-23 (1997-98).
20. Article XX(a).
21. Article XX(b).
22. Article XX(d).
23. Article XX(f).
24. Article XX(g).
25. Article XX(h).
26. Article XX(e).
27. Part of Uruguay Round Final Act, Dec. 15, 1993, Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M.
1130 (1994).
28. Part of Uruguay Round Final Act, Dec. 15, 1993, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994); see Meier, supra note 14, at 277-280; KATHARINA KUMMER, TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES AT THE INTERFACE OF
ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE, 72 (1994).

29.

Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1543.
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import of shrimp and shrimp products where harvesting methods
do not sufficiently protect sea turtles. Section 609 provides, inter
alia, that the import ban will not apply to harvesting countries that
are certified by the U.S. administration. According to regulatory
guidelines, the certification shall be granted to either countries with
a fishing environment that does not pose a threat of the incidental
taking of sea turtles31 or to harvesting nations that adopt a
regulatory program that is comparable to and as effective as the
regulatory program of the United States. The U.S. program
requires the use of "turtle excluder devices" (TEDs), which in the
actual application of the regulation became the standard requirement for granting the certification. In 1996, India, Malaysia, and
Thailand filed a complaint with the WTO, alleging that the
legislation has constituted unfair trade practices. In April of 1998
a WTO Panel found that the U.S. measure violated GATT's
provision against quantitative restrictions (Article XI) and the
most-favoured-nations principle (Article I:1).32 The Panel also
held that the import restriction could not qualify for either of
GATT's environmental exceptions in Article XX. 3 The United
States appealed the panel's decision, focussing only on the Panel's
holding concerning Article XX. 4 The Appellate Body held that
the findings of the Panel constituted error in legal interpretation
and reversed them.35 Though not requested by the United States,
the Appellate Body completed the legal analysis36 and found

30. Conservation of Sea Turtles; Importation of Shrimp, Pub.L. 101-162, Title
VI, §609, Nov. 21 1989, 103 Stat. 1037.
31. Shrimp trawling has one of the highest rates of incidental takings
(bycatch), and is, as of 1996, the biggest anthropogenic source of mortality of sea
turtles; see A. CHARLOTTE DE FONTAUBERT, DAVID R. DOWNES & TUNDI S.
AGARDY, BIODIVERSITY IN THE SEAS: IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON BiOLOGICAL DIVERSITY IN MARINE AND COASTAL HABITATS (1996), 20.

32. United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, Final Report of the Panel, WT/DS58/R, at 268-271, paras. 7.11-7.23
[hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle Panel Report].
33. Id. at 285, para. 7.62.
34. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 26, para. 98. The
violation of Article XI was a prerequisite for the Appellate Body and was not
questioned in its report.
35. Id. at 34, para. 122.
36. The Appellate Body reasoned that procedure with its mandate under
Article 17 DSU and Article 3.7 DSU, which emphasizes that the "aim of the
dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute." Id. at
34-35, paras. 123-124.
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according to its own holding that the measure at stake could not
37

qualify as a justification under Article
III.

XX.

Article XX(g)
Initially, the Appellate Body established the sequence for

carrying out an analysis under Article XX.

In contrast to the

Panel's report, the Appellate Body held that the structure and logic

of Article XX requires an initial determination of whether the
violating measure qualifies for one of the specific justifications in
Article XX(a)-(j), and then application of the broad language of
the "chapeau" to the specific provisional justification.38 In the
context of the Shrimp/Turtle case, U.S. measures must be found to

"relat[e] to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption."39
A.

"Exhaustible Natural Resources"
The Shrimp/Turtle dispute was not the first case under the

WTO/GATT dispute settlement system that involved conservation
measures for animals.

In the Herring/Salmon case4 ° the panel

needed to note only that the "United States agreed that salmon
and herring were exhaustible natural resources."41 The two
Tuna/Dolphin panel reports did not spend a single word on that
problem. 42 Therefore, the Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body report

37. Id. at 56, para. 187.
38. Id. at 32-33, paras. 117-120. The "chapeau" is the introductory clause of
Article XX.
39. Article XX(g).
40. Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon, Mar. 22, 1988, L/6268 - 35S/98 [hereinafter Herring/Salmon]. In this
dispute the United States challenged a Canadian regulation that prohibited the
exportation of unprocessed salmon and herring. Canada argued that this measure
was intended to conserve its fishing stocks within the meaning of Article XX(g).
41. Id. at 22, para. 3.29.
42. See the discussion of Article XX(g) in United States - Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel, Sept. 3, 1991, DS21/R [hereinafter
Tuna/Dolphin I], at 46-47, paras. 5.30-5.34; United States - Restrictions on Imports
of Tuna, Report of the Panel, June 1994, DS29/R [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin II],
at 49-51, paras. 5.13-5.20. In these cases, which are similar in many respects to the
Shrimp/Turtle case, Mexico, the EC and the Netherlands challenged U.S.
restrictions on imports of yellowfin tuna. The Marine Mammal Protection Act
banned the importation of fish caught with fishing technology that results in excessive incidental takings of marine mammals. Because the number of incidental
deaths of dolphins during tuna fishing by Mexican boats was relatively high, the
U.S. government imposed an embargo on Mexican tuna harvested with purse-seine
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was the first to thoroughly address whether "living resources"43
fall under the definition of "exhaustible natural resources." The
Shrimp/Turtle panel report did not reach the question at stake,

because of its "chapeau-down" approach." Thus, the question
appeared to be a settled issue, 45 but the parties to the
Shrimp/Turtle dispute argued the issue extensively 46 .

Indian,

Pakistan, and Thailand found that only finite, non-living resources
are "exhaustible", reasoning that the term "exhaustible" would

become futile47 if all natural resources were considered to be
"exhaustible",

and because the drafting history of Article XX(g)

shows that the GATT drafters intended to protect minerals with
this provision.48 The Appellate Body rejected these arguments
and held that endangered living resources were within the scope of

Article XX(g). 49 Given that animals were considered in previous
panel reports as "exhaustible natural resources", the result is less

remarkable than how the court arrived at this conclusion.
Primarily, the Appellate Body referred to the textual interpretation and found that the term "exhaustible" does not exclude

"renewable" resources." The Appellate Body noted that the
drafting of the legislation took place 50 years ago, and that the
treaty must be read "in the light of contemporary concerns of the
community of nations about the protection and conservation of the
environment., 51 The language of the treaty is not "static", but

method. The United States attempted to justify the embargo, arguing that it
served to protect the life and health of dolphins, even outside US jurisdiction, and
to conserve an exhaustible natural resource. However, both panels rejected the
U.S. arguments and found that the measures were unjustified GATF violations.
43. Resources are defined as any material which when extracted has economic
value, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONNARY, 6 th ed. 1991, at 711. The term "living
resources" refers to the ability to reproduce respectively propagate itself existing
with animals respectively plants.
44. In contrast to the Appellate Body the Panel commenced its analysis of
Article XX with the chapeau. As it determined that the import restrictions on
shrimps are not consistent with the chapeau, the Panel did not find it necessary to
examine Article XX(g), Shrimp/Turtle Panel Report, supra note 32, at 285, para.
7.63.
45. Charnowitz (1998), supra note 17, at 909, (adding that this interpretation
is contrary to the technical meaning to the term "exhaustible").
46. Shrimp/Turtle Panel Report, supra note 32, at 3.237-3.240.
47. Id. at 3.237.
48. Id. at 3.238; referring to E/PC/T/C.II/QR/PV/5, 18 November 1946, at 79.
49. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 37, paras. 136-37;
whether non-endangered species might fall under Article XX(g) was not decided
by the Appellate Body.
50. Id. at 36, para. 128.
51. Id. at 36, para. 129.
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"by definition, evolutionary."52 Moreover, the Appellate Body
acknowledged that the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea,53 the 1992 Agenda 21," the 1992 Biodiversity Conven-

tion," and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory
Species of Wild Animals5 6 include "living", "biological",

or

"natural" resources in their scope and points out the emerging
international recognition of the importance of animal conservation.57 The Appellate Body also referred to the principle of
sustainable development,5 8 which is embodied in the preamble of

the 1994 WTO Agreement.

Worth mentioning in particular is

52. Id. at 36, para. 130.
53. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21
L.L.M. 1261 (1982) (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
54. Agenda 21, UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED),
Annex II, UN Doc. A/Conf. 151/26/Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in Agenda 21: Earth's
Action Plan, Nicholas A. Robinson (ed.), 1993.
55. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992)
(entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention].
56. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,
June 23, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 11 (1980) (entered into force Nov. 1, 1983).
57. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 36-37, paras. 13031.
58. The principle of sustainable development is a synthesis of the human need
for development and our responsibility for the environment. Development should
be achieved in a way that is the least environmentally harmful. This idea can be
traced back to the Stockholm Declaration in 1972 (11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972)), the
Brundtland Report (WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOP-

MENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE, 1987), which was named after the commission's
chairman Gro Harlem Brundtland, and which brought the principle of sustainable
development to international attention. In this report the principle is described
as the way "to ensure that [development] meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Id. at
8. At the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in
Rio de Janeiro it was consensus among the world's nations that sustainable
development has to become the centre of the global economic system (Article 1
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26,
31 I.L.M. 874 (1992)). See (about sustainable development) HUNTER, supra note
13, at 99-104.
59. Agreement for Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
33 L.L.M. 1144 (1994) (entered into force Jan. 1,1995) [hereinafter WTO Agreement], preamble:
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of
living,.., and expanding the production of and trade in goods and
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both
to protect and conserve the environment and to enhance the means for
doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns
at different levels of economic development. . . (emphasis added).
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footnote 107, in which the Appellate Body states that "this concept
[of sustainable development] has been generally accepted....
The Tuna/Dolphin I Report used the drafting history to decide
that nothing had changed in the last decades, 61 but the Appellate
Body explicitly acknowledged the need to broaden the scope of the

environmental exception due to raising international concerns
about the environment. The Appellate Body's approach shows a

major change in the way environmental issues are perceived.62
The report not only acknowledged the principle of sustainable
development as "generally accepted" but also fundamentally based

a part of its analysis on this principle. Previous reports may have
noted this principle, but limited its effect by remarking that "the
central focus of the agreement remains the promotion of economic
development through trade."63 Furthermore, the Appellate Body
looked at a number of environmental treaties and even referred
twice' to the Brundtland-Report, 65 a report that in 1987 deter-

mined the alarming environmental state of the earth and has since
become a major source for environmental advocates. These
arguments show clearly that the Appellate Body is willing to

seriously consider developments, treaties, and statements that
derive from outside the WTO, even if they might not support the

objective of free trade.'
The Appellate Body's clarification of the applicability of

Article XX(g) to endangered species is a positive event, especially
because in doing so it opens its view towards aspects outside the
trade spectrum. The discussed rationale indicates a significant
strengthening of environmental positions within the GATT-

environment debate.

60. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 36, Fn. 107.
61. Tuna/Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 42, at 45, para. 5.26, concerning
the question whether the protection of extrajurisdictional living beings can be
justified by Article XX(b).
62. See (concerning the development within the WTO dispute settlement
system to better consider international law outside the WTO David Palmeter &
Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
398 (1998)).
63. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 277, para. 7.42.
64. Id. at 36, Fn. 106, 107.
65. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note
58.
66. This can also be seen as part of a development within the WTO legal
system, to increasingly recognize sources of law outside the WTO and move away
from the largely self-contained system. For a detailed analysis of this problem see
David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, supra note 62, at 398-413.
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B. Extrajurisdictionality
One of the most complex problems concerns trade measures
that are intended to protect subjects outside a country's jurisdiction.67Th
The TuaItoa
Tuna/Dolphin I report referred to this problem as
"extrajurisdictional" application of Article XX(b) and (g). 6" The
Tuna/DolphinI Panel rejected the extrajurisdictional application of
Article XX(b) and (g) for numerous reasons. It noted that the
legislative history indicates this interpretation for Article XX(b).69
Further, it relied on the reasoning of the Herring/Salmon Report
stating that a measure would qualify under Article XX(g) only if it
were "primarily aimed at rendering effective these restrictions [on
domestic production and consumption]. '7 ° The Tuna/Dolphin I
Panel concluded that as a country can only control the production
and consumption under its own jurisdiction, Article XX(g) was
intended solely to permit trade measures that did not aim at
extrajurisdictional production and consumption.7 1 Some commentators71 agreed with the panel's interpretation, but this perspective
also generated criticism. Against these decisions it has been
asserted that nothing in the semantics or in the systematic context
provides for this limited application of Article XX(b) and (g)."
Charnowitz has stated that the legislative history of Article XX(g)

67. See discussion in Steve Charnowitz, GATT and the Environment:
Examining the Issues, 4 INT'L ENVTL. AFFAIRES 203, 208-10 (1992); Shannon
Hudnall, Towards a Greener International Trade System: Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the World Trade Organization, COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 175, 200-02 (1996); Foster, supra note 19, at 400-06.
68. Tuna /Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 42, at 47, para. 5.32.
69. Id. at 45, para. 5.26. Article XX(b) was construed after the New York
Draft of the International Trade Organization Charter which reads: "For the
purpose of protecting human, animal or plant life or health, if corresponding
domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist in the importing country."
Later, Commission A of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee in
Geneva dropped the last part of the provision as unnecessary. EPCT/A/PV/30/715.
70.

Herring/Salmon Panel Report, supra note 40, at 114, para. 4.6.

71.

Tuna/Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 42, at 47, para. 5.31.

72. Ted L. McDorman, The GA TT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes
to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 477, 522 (1991); Steven Shrybman, InternationalTrade and
the Environment, 20 THE ECOLOGIST 30, 33 (1990); undecided John H. Jackson,
World Trade Rules and EnvironmentalPolicies: Congruenceor Conflict, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1227, 1240-41 (1992).

73.

Charnowitz (1994), supra note 19, at 328; SUSANNE RUBLACK, DER GREN-

ZUBERSCHREITENDE VERKEHR VON UMWELTRISIKEN IM VOLKERRECHT [The

transboundary movement of environmental risks in international law] 269 (1992).
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does not support the panel's conclusion74 and opined that there is
no reason that Article XX(b) is intended to be less cosmopolitan
than Article XX(g).75 Moreover, it has been argued that environ76
mental measures by their nature have extraterritorial effects.
Furthermore, trade measures are extraterritorial by definition, and
therefore are acceptable within the GATT framework.77
A
restriction would inappropriately limit the pursuit of environmental
goals and would only be justified under circumstances where
protectionism is the objective. 71
Although the Appellate Body explicitly stated that it did not
address the question of whether there is a jurisdictional limitation
in Article XX(g), it noted that "in the specific circumstances of the
case before us, there is sufficient nexus between the migratory and
endangered marine population involved and the United States for
purposes of Article XX(g). ' 79 This statement has to be interpreted to mean that the Appellate Body did not find the U.S. measure
to have an extrajurisdictional effect. This conclusion can be drawn
from the fact that the Appellate Body did not see the need to
decide the question whether Article XX(g) is applicable to
extrajurisdictional measures,8" because the migratory turtles at
issue reside in waters over which the United States has jurisdiction.81 This rationale can be related to the "principle of common
concern of humankind," based on the growing consensus that the
world is ecologically interdependent and that humanity has a
collective interest in certain activities or resources, no matter where
they take place or where they are located.' Codified examples of
this concept can be found in the Climate Change Convention 3
that, in its preamble, acknowledges that "change in the earth's
climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind" and the Biodiversity Convention' that affirms "that the
conservation of biodiversity is a common concern of humankind."

74. Charnowitz, supra note 19, at 328.
75. Rublack, supra note 74, at 210.
76. Foster, supra note 19, at 402; Foster uses the term "extraterritorial" in this
context to be synonymous with "extrajurisdictional".
77. Id. at 405.
78. Id. at 428.
79. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 38, para. 133.
80. Id. at 39, para. 133.
81. Id. at 38, para. 133.
82. HUNTER, supra note 13, at 343.
83. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 29, 1992,
31 I.L.M. 849 (1992).
84. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 54.
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The Appellate Body's holding was received as a great success
for the environmental protection within the GATT, as it could
mean that all environmentally related trade measures that somehow
affect subjects within the jurisdiction of the acting state 5 could be
justified by Article XX(b) or (g) 86 (which does not include the
requirements contained in the chapeau). The general rule that
might be derived from the Appellate Body report is that a
sufficient nexus between the protected subject and a country exists
when the natural resource is at least temporarily within the
jurisdiction of the country that invokes the Article XX exception
even though the damaging activity takes place outside its territory.
However, it remains to be seen whether and to what extent future
WTO reports will adopt the rationale of the Appellate Body.
C

The Meaning of the Term "Relating to"

Having determined that the sea turtles are exhaustible natural
resources, the Appellate Body next addressed the question of
whether their conservation "relat[es] to" the measures sought to be
justified.87 The meaning of this language was already analyzed in
previous GATT reports. The panel in the Herring/Salmon case
introduced the interpretation that the measure had to be "primarily
aimed at", but not necessary or essential for the conservation of
natural resources.8 8 The Tuna/Dolphin panels referred to this
wording, but did not' stop at the semantic interpretation of Article
XX(g), holding that the Article has to be read "in a manner that
preserves the basic objectives and principles of the General
Agreement."8 9 The Tuna/Dolphin I report regarded a trade
measure as not primarily aimed at the objectives of Article XX(g),
because they were based on "unpredictable conditions."9 The
Tuna/Dolphin II panel added that Article XX(g) cannot be
"interpreted to permit contracting parties to take trade measures
so as to force other contracting parties to change their policies
within their jurisdiction," because this would seriously impair "the

85. Ozone depletion, transboundary air and water pollution, climate change,
loss of biodiversity, etc.
86. Phillipe Sands, Lecture at American University, WCL, November 11, 1998.
87. This analyzed part of Article XX(g), supra note 1, reads: "nothing... shall
be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement . . . of measures: (g) relating
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources..." (emphasis added).
88. Herring/Salmon Panel Report, supra note 40, at 38, para. 4.6.
89. Tuna/Dolphin II Panel Report, supra note 42, at 52, para. 5.26.
90. Tuna/Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 42, at 47, para. 5.33.
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balance of rights and obligations among contracting parties."9
The rationale of this interpretation was clearly the result which the
panels wanted to achieve. The panels found that it was not GATTconsistent to force other countries to adopt certain policies, and
used the unclear term92 "relating to" to introduce additional
restrictions.
A later decision of the Appellate Body in the Reformulated
93
Gasoline
dispute addressed the problem differently. It interpreted the "relating to" language as requiring a "substantial relationship" of the measure and the conservation of resources and did not
overload it with the consideration of the objectives of the
GATT.94 In fact, the Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body
found the chapeau to be a more ambiguous part of Article XX,
into which it could introduce its concerns regarding the abuse of
the environmental exception.9 5 This decision was regarded as a
step towards a more environmental friendly reading of Article
96
XX(g).

The Shrimp/Turtle Panel Report was convinced by this latter
approach, and did not bother with the analysis of Article XX(g) or
(b). 97 Instead the report focused on the chapeau. 98 The appellate decision reversed this approach9 9 and interpreted the "relating
to" clause similarly to how it had in the Reformulated Gasoline
dispute. To determine whether the U.S. measures and the
objective of conserving sea turtles were substantially related, the
Appellate Body stated that the U.S. legislation is "not disproportionately wide in its scope and reach in relation to the policy
objective of protection and conservation of sea turtles species" and
that "[i]n principle the means are, in principle, reasonably related
to the ends."1 ° It concluded that the legislation that restricted
the shrimp imports was indeed related to the conservation of an

91. Tuna/Dolphin II Panel Report, supra note 42, at 52, para. 5.26.
92. Id. at 52, para. 5.25.
93. United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
Appellate Body Report, adopted May 20, 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R. In this dispute
Venezuela (later joined by Brazil) brought a complaint before the WTO Panel
against a United States regulation, which set out requirements for gasoline to
control the pollution from gasoline combustion.
94. Id. at 19.
95. Id. at 22-29.
96. HUNTER, supra note 13, at 1196; Foster, supra note 19, at 430.
97. Shrimp/Turtle Panel Report, supra note 32, at 285, para. 7.63.
98. Id. at 273, para. 7.28.
99. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 33, para. 118.
100. Id. at 40, para. 141.
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natural resource within the meaning of Article
exhaustible
10 1
XX(g).

This reasoning makes it clear that the narrow, result-oriented
interpretation of the words "relating to" by the Tuna/Dolphin
panels is not applicable anymore. Though the concept of stare
decisis does not exist in the WTO dispute settlement system, this
decision effectively overruled the Tuna/Dolphin reports, in favor of
the Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report. This reasoning
fulfills the self-imposed requirements of treaty interpretation, as it
reflects the ordinary meaning of the words "relating to," read in
their context, and in the light of the object and purpose of the
GATT. The meaning of the disputed words as well as the context
and the purpose of the GATT clearly does not require one to
consider whether the measure is unpredictable or whether it
coerces other countries to change their policies. The function of
the words "relating to" in the context of Article XX is to ensure
that a measure does not aim at other objectives, such as the
protection of the domestic industry. It is not the purpose of that
language to provide a balance between trade and environmental
objectives and narrow down the scope of Article XX(g) but to rule
out measures that do not focus on the conservation of natural
resources. In conclusion, the Appellate Body report's holding on
the language of "relating to" is appropriate and is welcomed as it
definitely abolished the flawed interpretation of the Tuna/Dolphin
panels.
D.

The Meaning of the "Made Effective in Conjunction with"
Clause

The last clause of Article XX(g) requires that the measures at
issue "are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
In analyzing the
domestic production and consumption.' 02
clause, the Appellate Body again referred to and confirmed its
previous holdings in the Reformulated Gasoline Report. In this
report two different issues were discussed. The Appellate Body
first addressed how the words "in conjunction with" were to be
read and whether they were to be applied identically to domestic
and imported products. In its analysis in the Reformulated Gas

101. Id. at 40, para. 142.
102. As discussed above, this clause was used in the Tuna/Dolphin I report to
support the holding that Article XX(g) is not applicable to extrajurisdictional
natural resources. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 42, at 11.
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case, the Appellate Body found that there was "no textual basis for
requiring identical treatment,' ' 10 3 but that "the clause is a requirement of even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions, in the
name of conservation, upon the production or consumption of
exhaustible natural resources."'" The measures concerned must
impose restrictions, not just "in respect of" imported products but
also "with respect to" domestic products. 5 The Shrimp/Turtle
Appellate Body report adopted this analysis and noted that the
disputed U.S. legislation imposed similar restrictions both on U.S.
shrimp trawl vessels and shrimp importers. The Appellate Body
concluded
that it was "in principle .... an even-handed mea106
sure."'
The second issue addressed in the Reformulated Gasoline
Appellate Body Report was the question whether the clause "if
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption" (emphasis added) in Article XX(g)
was intended to establish an empirical "effects test." The Appellate Body denied the applicability of such a test because it would
be too difficult to determine the causation of such effects, and
because measures which under any circumstances cannot have a
possible effect on conservation goals would not have been "primarily aimed at" the conservation." 7 The recent Appellate Body
Report did not address this issue, indicating the "effects test" is no
longer relevant.
E. Interim Conclusion
The interpretation of Article XX(g) in the Appellate Body
Report is objective, textually focussed and not overloaded with
result-orientated, trade-protective thoughts. The interpretation of
Article XX(g) has been consistent with the former Appellate Body
Report in the Reformulated Gasoline case, but has incorporated
new perspectives that are consistent with and can be related to
principles of international environmental law. In conclusion, the
Appellate Body's analysis of Article XX(g) is welcomed for both
the legalistic methods it applied and the results it yielded.
However, having fulfilled the requirements of Article XX(g) means

103.
104.
105.
106..
107.

Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 93, at 21.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 40, para. 144.
Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 93, at 21-22.
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only a provisional justification;1" 8 the significant threshold for the
disputed measure will be found in the chapeau.
IV

The Chapeau" 9 of Article XX GATT

As mentioned above, the WTO dispute settlement body
reports focused their legal analysis of environmentally induced
trade restrictive measures on the introductory clause of Article XX
(the "chapeau") and found therein the grounds for denying a
justification under Article XX." °
The chapeau introduces two general requirements to the
otherwise absolute provision that "nothing in this Agreement" shall
prevent the adoption of measures to achieve the policy goals
enumerated in Article XX(a)-(j). It requires that "measures are
not applied in a manner which would constitute (1) a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between two countries
where the same conditions prevail, or (2) a disguised restriction on
international trade."
In general, there is a broad agreement between the WTO
dispute bodies,"' the parties in the Shrimp/Turtle dispute,12
and environmental groups 13 that the chapeau is designed to

prevent abuse of the Article XX exceptions. Despite this superficial consensus, the exact meaning of the ambiguous language is
heavily disputed. The debate in the Shrimp/Turtle case, in

particular, dealt with the question of whether and under what

108. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 41, para. 147.
109. The chapeau reads: "Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the or enforcement by any Member of measures:"
110. Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 93, at 22-29;
Shrimp/Turtle Panel Report, supra note 32, at 273-285, paras. 7.31-7.61.
111. Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 93, at 22;
Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 45, para. 145. Both reports
referred to the negotiating history, specifically 1946, when the United Kingdom
proposed that "in order to prevent abuse of the exceptions of Article 32 [which
would subsequently become Article XX]", the chapeau of this provision should be
qualified.
112. Arguments of United States in Shrimp/Turtle dispute, reported in
Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 6, para. 14; arguments of
India, Pakistan, Thailand in Shrimp/Turtle dispute, reported in Shrimp/Turtle
Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 11, para. 36.
113. CIEL et. al., Amicus Brief to the Appellate Body on United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, July 23, 1998, at 41,
para. 3.6.
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conditions the invocation of the environmental exception for
unilateral trade restricting measures would constitute such an
abuse.
A. General Considerations
1. Previous WTO Dispute Settlement Reports-The Reformulated Gasoline report dealt with the interpretation of the chapeau
in dicta. Concerning the general considerations it stated that
[t]he chapeau is animated by the principle that while the
exceptions of Article XX may be invoked as a matter of legal
right, they should not be so applied as to frustrate or defeat the
legal obligations of the holder of the right under the substantive
rules of the General Agreement. If those exceptions are not to
be abused or misused, in other words, the measures falling
within the particular exceptions must be applied reasonably,
with due regard both to the legal duties of the party claiming
the exception and the legal rights of the other parties concerned." 4
Referring to these statements, the Shrimp/Turtle Panel held that the
chapeau "only allows Members to derogate from GATT provisions
so long as, in doing so, they do not undermine the WTO multilateral trading system, thus also abusing the exceptions contained in
Article XX."' 5 Therefore, the panel must also consider "whether
such type of measure, if it were to be adopted by other members,
would threaten the security and predictability of the multilateral
16
trading system.',
The Shrimp/Turtle panel based its decision on these general
considerations and concluded that "requiring that other Members
adopt policies comparable to the U.S. policy for their domestic
markets and all other markets represents a threat to the WTO
multilateral trading system. '
This reasoning was criticized as
a misunderstanding of the purpose of Article XX, which is not to
provide guaranteed market access under all circumstances, but to

114. Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 93, at 22; in
the cited passage, it is remarkable that the Appellate Body referred to the duties
of the party which invokes the exception and the rights of the other parties. A
reasonable application, should take into account the duties and rights of both
parties.
115. Shrimp/Turtle Panel Report, supra note 32, at 278, para. 7.44.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 280-81, para. 7.51.
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disallow market access for certain limited reasons and to 11allow
8
discrimination based on specific environmental policy goals.
2. The Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body-The Appellate Body
did not agree with this interpretative analysis either and reversed
it.119 It complained that the panel interpreted the object and
purpose of the whole of the GAT- and the WTO Agreement in an
overly broad manner rather than taking a precise look at the
chapeau. The Appellate Body found that maintaining the multilateral trade system is neither a right nor an obligation nor an
interpretative rule under Article XX. Furthermore the panel did
not inquire into how the disputed measure "was being applied in
a manner as to constitute abuse or misuse of a given kind of
12
exception. 1
In its dicta, the Appellate Body laid out its own general
considerations. In determining a frame of principles and documents within which the chapeau the must be considered, the
Appellate Body referred to the preamble of the new WTO
Agreement. It noted that the preamble calls for "the optimal use
of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of
sustainable development," and added that this preambular language
"must add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of
the . . . GATT 1994.,,121 Further, it noted the establishment of a
permanent Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE), with the
agenda to solve trade and environment conflicts. It is also pointed
out the ministerial decision establishing the CTE, which took note
of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, in
particular Principle 12122 and Agenda 21.23 Further, the Appellate Body stated that the chapeau embodies the need "to maintain
a balance of rights and obligations between the right of a Member
to invoke one or another of the exceptions of Article XX ...and
the substantive rights of the other Members under the GAT
1994. ' ' 124 A line of equilibrium between the two positions, which

118. CIEL et al., supra note 113, at 44-45, note 209.
119. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 34, para. 122.
120. Id. at 32, para. 116.
121. Id. at 43, para. 153.
122. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 58; Principle 12 calls for multilateral solutions and agreements concerning environment and
development issues. This principle will be discussed infra, in respect to the
problem of unilateralism.
123. Again, the Appellate Body referred to the principle of sustainable development and another hint for the increasing openness towards external sources of law.
124. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 44, para. 156.
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moves as the interests at stake vary, has to be marked out.'25
The Appellate Body also added that the chapeau expresses the
principle of good faith.126
3. Critique-Byintroducing a balancing test and a good faith
principle, the Appellate Body has opened the door for arguments
and requirements that do not necessarily need to have a textual
basis. In contrast to the Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body
Report,12 7 the Appellate Body in the Shrimp/Turtle report explicitly acknowledged that both sides of the dispute have rights and
duties, between which a balance needs to be struck. However, it
remains questionable whether this balance requirement can be
derived from the accepted function of the preamble to prevent the
abusive invocation of Article XX. It is without doubt that that the
GATT imposes numerous duties on its members to reduce trade
restrictions, and establishes the right of the other members to
unrestricted market access. However, the (provisional) justification
of a trade restriction under Article XX(a)-(j) conflicts with this,
because it creates a right to impose the trade measure and rejects
the rights of the other members deriving from Articles I, III or XI.
This assumption can be supported by the language of the chapeau,
which provides that aside from the enumerated reasons, "nothing
in [the] agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption and
enforcement" of the exempted measures. Article XX itself does
not establish an independent legal right for other members, 128 it
only protects the other members from the abuse of rights. If the
function of the chapeau is to prevent the abuse of these rights, the
analysis of the chapeau should reflect this function. In other words,
the starting point of the analysis should be the right of the member
to invoke the exception and not a balance between rights and
duties of all members based on the bona fide principle. Once a
right has been established, it must be examined to see whether an
abuse took place. For purposes of this examination it should be
emphasized that an abuse is the exception rather than the rule.
Moreover, the chapeau provides an ambiguous but explicit
description for the existence of an abuse. Thus, there is neither a

125. Id. at 45, para. 159.
126. Id. at 45, para. 158.
127. See Taxes on Automobiles, supra at 18.
128. See Charnowitz (1998), supra note 17, at 911-12, who criticizes the Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report "as being circular in suggesting that
Article XX must be interpreted to preserve legal rights which themselves can only
determined by article XX."
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need nor a conceptual basis for this kind of balance analysis.
However, the Appellate Body considered the balance principle only
in a general way and moved on to analyze the language of the
chapeau of Article XX.
B. Application of Measure Constitutes Unjustifiable Discrimination

The chapeau contains three different situations under which a trade
restriction is considered abusive and cannot be ultimately justified.
The Appellate Body first examined whether the measure was
"applied in a manner which would constitute a means of unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail."' 29 The Appellate Body did not explicitly define the
term "unjustifiable discrimination." Instead, the Appellate Body
ruled out certain interpretations and laid out a set of characteristics
that establish an "unjustifiable discrimination." As already held in
the Reformulated Gasoline Report, the Appellate Body noted that
the discrimination in Article XX is different in its nature and
quality than the discrimination in the treatment of products in the
meaning of Articles I, III, X.1 30 Otherwise, a violation of the
free trade principles would automatically lead to the rejection of
the exception in Article XX.
The Appellate Body then went on to reject an argument...
that the policy goal of a measure can provide for its justification
under the standard of the chapeau, because this "would be to
disregard the standards of the chapeau.', 132 In other words, the
chapeau would no longer be able to safeguard against abuse if a
policy goal which qualifies under Article XX(a)-(j) would also
suffice to justify a discrimination under the chapeau. The chapeau
addresses any "unjustifiable discrimination" that arises from the
application of the measure at stake, whereas the other provisions
in the GATT"affect the measure itself.
In keeping with this provision, the Appellate Body looked at
the actual application of the U.S. shrimp import ban and concluded
129. The other two standards are: 1) application of a measure in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail; 2) application of a measure in a manner which
would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. The first of those
standards is discussed infra, whereas the second standard was not at issue in the
Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report.
130. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 42, para. 142.
131. Argument of U.S. in Shrimp/Turtle dispute, reported in id. at 8, para. 22.
132. Id. at 41, para. 149.
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that the "cumulative effect" of the differences in the means of
application of Section 609 constituted an "unjustifiable discrimina'
tion."133
The Appellate Body criticized the following features of
the U.S. measure in its actual application: (1) it coerces other
members to adopt essentially the same regulatory program; (2) the
failure of the United States to engage in serious multilateral
negotiations with the objective of concluding bi- or multilateral
agreements for the protection of sea turtles; (2a) the United States
concluded one regional agreement, but did not negotiate with other
countries; (3) countries which desired certification under Section
609 were treated differently.
1. The Coercive Effect-Primarily, the Appellate Body
complained about the coercive effect of the measure's application
on the policy decisions made by foreign governments, because it
requires "all other exporting Members, if they wish to exercise their
GATT rights, to adopt essentially the same policy" that is in effect
in the United States. 34 Although the "statute appears to permit
a degree of discretion and flexibility in how the standards for
comparability might be applied," any flexibility has been eliminated
in the actual "implementation of that policy through the 1996
Guidelines ... and the practice of the administrators in making

certification determinations."' 35 Also, under the certification rule,
individuals who catch shrimp with identical methods as required in
the United States, but who fish in waters of uncertified countries
are still not permitted to import their shrimp. This situation "is
difficult to reconcile with the declared policy objective of protecting
and conserving sea turtles.' ' 136 The court believes "that discrimination results not only when countries in which the same conditions
prevail are differently treated, but also when the application of a
measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry into the appropriateness of the regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in
those exporting countries."' 37
This analysis of the Appellate Body does not differ in its
outcome from holdings of previous panels. Both, the Tuna/Dolphin

133. Id. at 53, para. 176.
134. Id. at 46, para. 161.
135. Id.; the Appellate Body explained that under the guidelines at stake a
certification "shall" only be granted, if the foreign state has adopted a regulation
that mandates the use of effective TED's and if it has a "credible enforcement
effort" in place, id. at 46, para. 162.
136. Id. at 47, para. 165.
137. Id.
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II decision13 8 as well as the Shrimp/Turtle Panel Report13 9 based
their findings on the fact that the regulation forced other parties to
change their policies. The most obvious difference is that the
Appellate Body did not categorically condemn the U.S. legislation,
but tried to look in detail at the actual application of the measure
and its flaws. Nevertheless, it remains questionable whether the
underlying rationale of pushing other countries to adopt policies is
permissible. It is suspicious that precisely the same rationale, which
in one decision was used to deny that the measure was relating to
the conservation of natural resources under Article XX(g),
reappears to give reasons for the determination of an "unjustifiable
discrimination."
Furthermore, every trade measure that is provisionally justified
under Article XX(g) forces and is intended to force foreign states
or at least foreign exporters to change their policies. Taking into
account the rationale that the coercive measures at stake invade the
sovereignty of other nations and dictate foreign conservation
policies, it can be rebutted that otherwise the United States loses
its sovereign power to regulate how its internal market is to be
used and to correct what it reasonably perceives as market
distortions.14 ° This leads to the question of which country's rights
are at stake in the chapeau of Article XX.141
Further, the import ban for shrimps that are fished with turtle
excluder devices (TEDs) in uncertified waters is a discrimination
that on the first view does not support the conservation goal of the
U.S. legislation. However, this discrimination simply does not take
place between countries. Moreover, the Appellate Body did not
even address the question of whether this alleged discrimination, as
well as the entire certification rule, may be justified by the fact that
a reasonable alternative might not exist. Case by case decisions
about the import of particular shrimps depending on the way how

138. Tuna/Dolphin II Panel Report, supra note 42, at 52, para. 5.26: "If
however Article XX were interpreted to permit contracting parties to change their
policies within their jurisdiction, including their conservation policies, the balance
of rights and obligations among contracting parties, in particular the right of access
to markets would be seriously impaired." It has to be noted that this analysis in
Tuna/Dolphin II addressed Article XX(g). Id.
139. Shrimp/Turtle Panel Report, supra note 32, at 280, para. 7.51: "requiring
that other Members adopt policies comparable to the US policy for their domestic
markets and all other markets represents a threat to the WTO multilateral trading
system." Id.
140. Stephen J. Porter, Note, The Tuna/Dolphin Controversy: Can the GATT
Become Environment-Friendly?,5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 103 (1992).
141. See id.
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they are fished are not verifiable and enforceable, and thus would
lead to the failure of the conservation objective and/or an increase
in fraudulent labeling and a different kind of unfairness. Ultimately, the Appellate Body's rationale to show that the coercive effect
of the application of Section 609 is an "unjustifiable discrimination"
is not convincing.
2. Unilateralism-Thesecond and maybe the most important
aspect 142 of the debate is the unilateral character of the measure's
application. The Appellate Body criticized the "failure of the
United States to engage ... other Members exporting shrimp to

the United States, in serious, across-the-board negotiations with the
objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements for the
protection and conservation of sea turtles, before enforcing the
import prohibition against the shrimp exports of those other Mem'
bers."143
It is notable that the Appellate Body did not necessarily
exclude unilateral measures, but that it required serious negotiations before taking unilateral actions as a last resort. Similar
language was already included in the panel's report, which stated
that its "findings regarding Article XX do not imply that recourse
to unilateral measures is always excluded, particularly after serious
attempts have been made to negotiate." 144
Environmentalists argued that the United States nevertheless
was justified in acting alone, because there is a broad international
consensus for protecting endangered species. 145 In their amicus
brief, environmental groups acknowledged that numerous international agreements require the protection of endangered, migratory
marine resources. 146 They note that all five sea turtle species are
listed as endangered under the Convention to Regulate Trade in
Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES). 147 Further, the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

142. John Jackson: "This case is really about unilateralism - one country
imposing its view of what is appropriate for the environment, without adequate
attempt to build multilateral mechanisms," cited in Julie Kosterlitz, Shell Game,
30 Nat'l J. 2102, 2105 (Sept. 12, 1998).
143. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 48, para. 166.
144. Shrimp/Turtle Panel Report, supra note 32, at 285, par. 7.61.
145. Kosterlitz, supra note 142, at 2105.
146. CIEL et al., supra note 113, at 26-30, para. 3.2.1.
147. Convention to Regulate International Trade in Endangered Species of
Flora and Fauna, March 3, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1085 (1973) (entered into force July 1,
1975) [hereinafter CITES].
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(UNCLOS)'48 provisions on living marine resources require members to protect marine life.1 49 Also the Food and Agriculture
Organization Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries promotes
remedies to the environmental consequences of the use of fishing
equipment and techniques that create significant bycatch and
resulting discard of non-target species.15 ° The Amicus Brief,5 '
further, mentions the Straddling Stocks Agreement,' the Biodiversity Convention,'53 and the Convention on the Conservation
of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,' to show the international consensus concerning the protection of endangered species. The
environmental groups claim that the complainants, which refuse to
implement TED programs, violate their commitments and obligations under the enumerated agreements because TEDs are the only
scientifically recognized effective means for turtle-safe shrimp
fishing. 55

Moreover, the environmental groups 1

6

stated that

148. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 53; signed
by 125 countries. Bycatch is the harvesting of species other than those targeted.
149. UNCLOS, supra note 53, Article 192.
150. FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries Article 6.2, 6.6:
elective and environmentally safe fishing gear and practices should be
further developed and applied, to the extent practicable, in order to
maintain biodiversity and to conserve the population structure and
aquatic ecosystems. Where proper selective and environmentally safe
fishing gear and practices exist, they should be recognized and accorded
priority in establishing conservation and management measures for
fisheries. States and users of aquatic ecosystems should minimize waste,
catch of non-target species, both fish and non-fish, and impacts on
associated or dependent species.
151. CIEL et al., supra note 113, at 28-29, para. 3.2.1.
152. Agreement for the Implementation of the Law of the Sea of 10 December
1982, Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, August 4, 1995, UN Doc. A/Conf. 164/38 (not yet
in force), Article 5: ". . . coastal States and States fishing on the high seas
shall ... (f) minimize ... catch of non-target species, both fish and non-fish
species ... through measures, to the extent practical, the development and use of
selective, environmentally safe and cost-effective fishing gear and techniques."
153. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 55, Article 11 requires parties (the
complainants are parties) to identify "processes and categories of activities which
have or are likely to have significant impacts on the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity;" Article 10(b) requires parties to "adopt measures
relating to the use of biological resources to avoid or minimize adverse impacts on
biological diversity."
154. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,
supra note 56; the sea turtles at stake are covered by this Convention; Article
III(4)(b) requires parties to take specific measures to prevent the adverse affects
of activities that could prevent the migration of the species.
155. CIEL et al., supra note 113, at 29, para. 3.2.1.
156. Id., at 30, para. 3.2.2.
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Principle 8157 of the Rio Declaration and Chapter 4 of Agenda
21158 oblige the United States, the world's second largest consumer of shrimp, "to reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of
'
consumption."159
The Appellate Body did not directly reject
these arguments. However, it referred to sections in the aforementioned agreements which declare multilateral actions to be the most
effective conservation measures. It cited Principle 12 of the Rio
Declaration which states that "[u]nilateral actions to deal with
environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing
country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing
transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as
possible, be based on international consensus." The Appellate
Body16 ° also cited similar language found in paragraph 2.22(i)
Agenda 21,6 in Article 5 of the Convention on Biological
Diversity, and in the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory
Species of Wild Animals. 162 The Appellate Body concluded that
the "unilateral character of the application of the [disputed
regulation] heightens the disruptive and discriminatory influence of
1 63
the [measure at stake] and underscores its unjustifiability.'
The reasoning of the Appellate Body is plausible and it shows
again that the court is willing to consider international law outside
the WTO system. However, the underlying rationale of the holding
is that the unilateral measures are not permissible, because they are
not the most effective possible solution. This rationale is based on
the idea of effectiveness and proportionality. As discussed
earlier, 6 4 the language and structure of the chapeau of Article
XX does not leave any room for these considerations. Additionally, the argument could be made that multilateral negotiations are
usually more time-consuming and for that reason might be less
157. Rio Declaration, supra note 122.
158. Agenda 21, supra note 54.
159. Principle 8 Rio Declaration, supra note 58.
160. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 49-50, para. 168.
161. Agenda 21, supra note 54, para. 2.22(i):
Governments should encourage GATT, UNCTAD and other relevant
international and regional economic institutions to examine, in accordance with their respective mandates and competences, the following
propositions and principles: ... (i) Avoid unilateral action to deal with
environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing
country. Environmental measures addressing transborder problems
should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus.
162. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,
supra note 56.
163. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 51, para. 172.
164. Article XX(b).
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effective than unilateral measures which can be adopted immediately. Further, the unilateral measures can be seen as an interim
solution until a multilateral agreement is concluded, or as incentive
to convene multilateral negotiations.

The Inter-American Convention-A third point in the line

3.

of alleged flaws which leads to "unjustifiable discrimination" is
closely related to the last issue. The Appellate Body criticized the
fact that the United States negotiated and concluded the InterAmerican Convention165 for the protection and conservation of
sea-turtles with only some of the affected countries. The Appellate
Body found that this agreement "provides convincing demonstration that an alternative course of action was reasonably open to the
United States for securing the legitimate policy goal of its measure." 1" The Appellate Body noted that a unilateral measure
was not the only available solution. Furthermore, the Appellate
Body held that the fact that the United States negotiated with
effect which was
some, but not with other WTO members, had'' 16an
7
"plainly discriminatory and ... unjustifiable.

Here, the Appellate Body's interpretation of Article XX corresponds, for the first time, with the actual language of the chapeau.
The criticized action does discriminate because it treats certain
countries differently. Whether this discrimination is unjustifiable
depends on the facts of the case. The United States would have to
provide a plausible reason why it negotiated first with some
countries and not with others.
4.

Other Differential Treatment-Finally,the court detected

that differential treatment was being given to various countries
desiring certification. Under the 1991 and 1993 guidelines, fourteen
countries in the Carribbean/western Atlantic region had a phase-in
period of three years, whereas all other states had only four months
16
to implement the requirement of compulsory use of TEDs
The Appellate Body rejected the U.S. explanation that the longer
implementation period was justified by the undeveloped character
of TED technology in 1991 respectively 1993, while in 1996
improvements made a shorter period possible. It held that even in
1996 the implementation of the U.S. policy caused administrative

165.
166.
167.
168.

Inter-American Convention, Dec. 1, 1996, 37 I.L.M. 1246 (1998).
Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 51, para. 171.
Id. at 51, para. 172.
Id. at 52, para. 173.
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and financial costs and difficulties that could not be overcome in a
short period of time.16 9 Moreover, the Appellate Body observed
that "[f]ar greater efforts to transfer [the required TED] technology
successfully were made to certain exporting countries" - basically
the fourteen wider Caribbean/western Atlantic countries cited
earlier - than to other exporting countries, including the appellees.17 °
C. Arbitrary Discrimination
The analysis of whether the measure at stake is applied in a
manner that arbitrarily discriminates between countries where the
same conditions prevail is significantly briefer than the one
concerning unjustifiable discrimination. The Appellate Body based
its finding of arbitrary discrimination two points: (1) the rigidity
and inflexibility of the certification process and (2) the lack of
transparency, 171 predictability, and thus, due process and basic
17 2
fairness in the certification process.
The first point of critique, the inflexibility in the issuance of
certifications, is grounded in the same observations as the complaint about the coercive effect of the measure, which is discussed
3
below.

17

Secondly, the Appellate Body criticizes the certification
process, which requires an application and the visit of U.S. officials
to the applicant country, but does not provide the opportunity for
an applicant country to be heard in the procedure or to appeal
from a denial of an application. 74 It contended that the procedure of certification was inconsistent with the standards of
transparency and procedural fairness established in Article X:3.
These alleged flaws in the application of the U.S. regulation are in
fact worth the criticism for they are not consistent with international standards of due process. To the extent that violations of due
process result in an arbitrary discrimination, the reasoning of the
Appellate Body has to be supported. However, the concept of due

169. Id. at 52, para. 174.
170. Id. at 53, para. 175.
171. It is noteworthy that the lack of transparency is one of the complaints
concerning the WTO dispute settlement procedure; see HUNTER, supra note 13,
at 1218-20; Foster, supra note 19, at 434-35; Kosterlitz, supra note 142, at 2105.
172. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 53-55, paras. 177184.
173. See id at 23.
174. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, at 53-54, paras. 178181.
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process relates to the way the public and the affected parties were
given the possibility to participate in the process, whereas arbitrariness focuses on the reasoning behind one's conduct, and not upon
any course of reasoning and exercise of judgment.175 Thus, the
court should have determined whether there was a plausible
reasoning behind the certification decisions. The existence of
procedural flaws exist does not automatically indicate arbitrariness.
At a minimum, it places a burden on the United States to show the
course of reasoning and exercise of judgement behind their nontransparent decisions.
D. Conclusion

The decision of the Appellate Body addresseded environmental concerns more than former reports and points out some serious
flaws in the application of the regulation at stake. However, the
interpretation of the chapeau in crucial points is still focused on
certain concepts such as the balance principle, the rejection of
unilateralism, or due process that are not necessarily reflected by
the language of the chapeau. Furthermore, the process of determining whether an 'unjustifiable discrimination" has occurred is
ambiguous. On the one hand, it shows some flexibility in the
court's perception of the measure at issue: In contrast to previous
decisions the court does not categorically condemn measures that
require the adoption of policies or that are applied unilaterally. It
is an expression of the WTO dispute settlement system's increased
openness that the system no longer considered free trade as the
singular objective of the WTO and the international community.
Because of this, the United States and the environmentalists have
reason to expect that slight changes in the application of environmentally induced trade restrictions might make them consistent
with the chapeau.
On the other hand, it is questionable whether the method of
identifying unjustifiable discrimination is permissible under the
chapeau. According to the Appellate Body's opinion, the chapeau
71 6
does not require that the measure be proportional or balanced,'
and its structure does not leave room for cumulative effects. A
measure is either applied in an unjustifiable discriminatory manner
or not; but it is not convincing to accumulate several minor
discriminations in order to state "unjustifiable discrimination." For

175.
176.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONNARY, supra note 39, at 69.
Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report supra note 3, at 21.
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this reason, the decision does not serve the predictability of future
decisions, because it did not become clear which of the minor
discriminations would be permitted, if the others were not existent.
V.

Conclusion and Outlook

Even after a detailed analysis of the report it remains ambiguous, whether the decision is a success from the environmental point
of view. The first obvious observation is that the analysis of section
(g) in Article XX evaluates environmental concerns stronger than
the chapeau discussion. Although the Appellate Body considered
in detail environmental documents and agreements for its findings,
it used these sources not only to support environmental interests
but also to reject them. The importance of the world trade system
and the WTO Dispute System require that the dispute settlement
bodies have an open mind towards all kinds of global problems,
and not view the problems from the trade perspective. The
Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body report is an important document
which leads into this direction of openness.
The Appellate Body broke with some previously criticized
holdings of WTO/GAT" dispute settlement bodies, but not all. A
policy and trade orientated interpretation of the chapeau still
prevails over a textual and structural analysis of the introductory
clause.
The value of the case for future decisions should not be
overestimated. Although the WTO dispute settlement system does
not abide by the principle of stare decisis, the report leaves open a
number of questions related to the environment-trade conflict
under GATT. In the first place are those concerning Article I, III,
XI or XX(b) which are not covered by the report. Moreover, the
findings concerning the chapeau leave room for speculation.
Would a regulation that applies to the singular shrimp and not to
the certification of a country be permissible? How much leverage
must be left for the foreign country concerning its legislative
power? Would a certification rule be an "unjustifiable discrimination," if the applying country seriously tried but failed to negotiate
a multilateral agreement? Would the U.S. regulation have been
chapeau consistent, if the United States had treated the countries,
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177. Given the statement of the U.S. trade representative that "the report does
not suggest that we weaken our environmental laws in any respect, and we do not
intend to do so" (cited in Swardson, supra note 5, at C2) it could be possible that
the case, similar to the Tuna/Dolphin case, will be a cause for another WTO
dispute.
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